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Abstract
This paper rests on an introductory study involving the new dimensions and
new strategies of European protest movements during the 1980's. The author focuses on the peace, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for autonomous
youth centers, in s. .,itzerland, racial disturbances in Britain and unrest among
the urban squatters in the German Federal Republic. The analysis of specific social rebellions is limited to a treatment of six dimensions. The "substantive"
dimensions include a) depoliticization; b) post11aterialism; and c) nationalism;
the "strategic" dimensions are a) radicalization; b) decentralization; and c)
institutionalization of protest. Protests of the eighties are found to differ
from movements of the sixties in relation to the ever more violent nature of confrontations between the citizen and the state, and with regard to a growing contingent of very young demonstrators, who have become a mobilizing force in their
own right. The paper concludes that the willingness to engage in the process of
system transformation is declining rapidly among protesters aged 15-24, at the
same time it is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated
in the movem~nts of the sixties. Both groups of protesters pose a significant
cha11erce, if not an existentia1 threat, to the estab1ished po1itica1 parties in
West European Systems.
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The more laws and restrictions. there are,
The poorer people become.
·
·
The sharper ~en's weapons,
The more trouble in the land~ The more ingenious and clever men are,
-The more.strange things happen.
The more rules and·regulations,
The more robbers and thieves.
~~Tao t~ Ching, 600.B.C.
A spectre of protest is haunting Europe, the likes of which have. not been vlitnessed in advance industrial societies since the late 1960 s. In regard _to.the latest
wave of demonstrations in major European cities, one might be tempted to assume that
many of the same activists, the old vanguard of the late sixties and early seventies,
have reemerged from their ideological closets with the intention of mobilizing a _..successor generation 11 of sympathizers around historical socjo-political controversies.
Both the scale and the scope of protest movements which have so charg~d the European
political climate in recent months nonetheless attest to the fact that the spirits
behind the outbursts of social unrest from Amsterdam to Zurich bear little family
resemblance to -those of earlier years. What is striking about these incidents of
mass protest is that the·present-day participants constitute a very inotley crew,·in
contrast to their more ideologically-pure predecessors. The activists of the eighties
are rallying to form often bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues
and goals. They are moreover committed to a broad range of organizational tactics and
sometimes even contradictory political strategies.
1

.

.

· This paper undertakes an·introductory study concerning the new dimensions and
new strategies.of political·protest in Western·Europe~ Based on field research con:ducted in Berlin, London and Zurich from May to July, 1982, ft· presents explanations
which are admittedly exploratory in nature and conclusions which.are tentative &t
best. In an effort to cultivate the Web~rian tradition of Verstehen as a research
skill, this author chose an eclectic strategy: data have been derived on the basis
of participant observation at demonstrations, walking tours· through affected ,neighborhoods, and infonnal interviews with people inside and outside "the scene," to
compl eme.nt her more orthodox documentation searches and media analyses.
•,

. The paper provides a broad overview of Eur_opean protest developments in an
effort to .assess the degree of continuity that might exist between the dissident
mqvements of the sixties, the seventies and the eighties. The 11 key issues'-' considered here include. the peace~, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for ciutonomous youth culture:centers, racial disturbances in Britain and the urban squat-ters1 campaigns in the Federal Republic of Germany. The work begins by raising
questions about the character of protest movements, 1980 1s-style, and their relation
to democrati<: political systems. The analysis of specific social rebellions, found
in Parts Two and Three, is limited to a treatment of six dimensions of protest, divided into two categories .. :The 11 substantive 11 dimensions <:onsidered include: a)
the degree of (de)politicization or ideolog·ical orfentation; b) the emphasis on
materialist versus 11 post-materialist11 values; _and c) trends toward nationalism
__
and questions of political -identification. The se·corid category consists of: 11 tactical/strategic11 dimensions: a) 11 radicalization 11 versus less militant fonns oLprotest; b) the role of (de)centralization and consensus-building; and._ c) the 11 insti tutiona 1i za tion 11 of protest, the 1ong-march ·strategy versus dropping-out. The
final section of the ~aper considers the nature of the State's fesponse to protest,
the linkages between conventional and-unconventional forms of participation and the
metamorphosis of the democratic process in Western Europe.
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INTERPRETING PROTEST, THEN ANO NOW

There is, in fact, a thread of continuity running through the protests of earlier years, both with respect to the movements' actual participants and with regard
to the political "causes" activists have sought to represent. The peace demonstrations of the 1980 1 s draw upon the traditions·of the Easter Marches and the AntiNucl ear ~~eapons Campaigns of the 1950 1 s. The batt1 es over the creation of autonomou! youth centers in Switzerland date back to the fund-raisi~g efforts of the fifties as we 11. sq·ua tters in Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Berlin can dra,..., upon the Wohngemei nschaften experiences in communal living shared by students of the sixtieS:-should the original model, the Paris Commun~ of the 1800 1 s, prove too remote.
~ut a comparison of protest activi tes across,. three decades al so revea 1s signif·i cant variations. The general thesis of this paper reads, that while there is an
element of "something o1d .•• something borrowed 11 to be found in the latest wave of
"demoslf -and campaigns, the resurgence of social unrest also involves "something
new and not necessarily cloaked in red, as was Marx's spectre of 1848. New to the
protest scene is the expectat'ion that dissent increasingly leads to violent confrontations between citizens and the state. Also new is the realization that a growing
contingent of alienated, non-university youth, aged 15-20, has become a mobilizing
force in its own right. The addition of these two features poses qualitatively differ·ent problems for democratic theorists, pol icy-makers and preservers of .the established public order.
·
11

Ronald· Inglehart~s 1971 analysis of "The Silent Revolution 11 in Western-Europe
began with the premise that 11 individuals pursue .various goals in hierarchical _order
-- giving maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a gtven time 11 (Inglehart, 1971, p~ 991). Intergenerational conflict is in some respects inevitable, to the extent that members of successive age.
cohorts, socialized under different political-economic conditions, develop different needs and are likely to retain a correspondingly different value hierarchy
throughout adulthood. Po1itica1 values may undergo substantial modification, however,
depending upon the interaction of cohort, life-cycle and period effects; -value modification, in turn, is subject to time lags, the length of which may also be a function of interactive effects (Inglehart, 1981, pp. 880-883).
Intergenerational conflict has given rise to many a social rebelli~n in Western nations, from the Young Hegelian Movement of the 1840's to the sexual revolution of the 1960 s. Protests mobilized by and confined to a specific cohort are
likely to evince more internal homogeneity and commonality of purpose than those
cutting across generational lines, the differentiating effects of class notwith.;.
standing. Protest developments of the 1980 s almost defy efforts at systematic
analysis; ideological and organizational patterns tend to be much more complex than
those witnessed two cir three decades ago. Their comp1exity owes to the fact that,
while the 11 causes 11 of protest find a traditional base in the generation gap between
established politicians and newly enfranchised citizens, it is also true that pro.test developments in Western Europe are characterized by significant intergenerational conflicts within and amona the dissident groups tbemselves.
1

1

The response, therefore, to the fundair,.:nta1 question, 11hether there exists
such~ thing as the.European protest movemert, is a resounding NO. As demcnstrated
below, politicaldissidence is a many-headej, multi-tailed animal, nourished by
numerous and conflicting groups, tactics arc! goals. Very significant differences .
are observed in relation to the degree of ,1oliticization; commitment to a specific·
ideological direction is more prevalent arr.ong the ·late forties to early fifties
cohort than among those born after 1960. Among the latter, protest tends to be
much more 11 existentialist 11 in nature (Haller, 1981, pp. 202-203). Further variations
are ri:anifest in the degree of radica1izat:on, that is, the proclivity toward ;;;ere
via 1ent forms of po 1i ti cal action.
1
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This raises a second important question: do the European outbursts of social
unrest have anYthing in -common? · What has· enabled these externally diverse and ·internally fragmented groups td. chalk-up many a successful mass mobilization campaign
-- from the 21 French and German citizen groups,- who joined forces to resist plans
for the Marckolsheim chemical plant on the-French side of the Rhine in 1972 (Nelkin
and Pollack, 1981, p. 60); to the 1,50,000 Germans who flocked 11 to the biggest dem,onstration ever seen in Wiesbaden 11 in November, 1981 to oppose constructiQn of the
Frankfurt runway Startbahn 18 West (Himmelheber, 1982, p. 6); to the 300,000 German,
Dutch ·and 11 other" demonstrators who rallied for peace in Bonn on-·October 10; 1981
(Deile, et al,_ 1981, p. 9ff)? Two ·elements permeate the movements. First, gerinane
to all is the sense of radical_ opposition to fundamental premises and practices dominating their respective political-economic·establishments. Secondly, the fusion of
the dissident· movements is grounded, in common political learning experiences, positive and negative, which have subsequently_ been· adapted to suit ·other prote·st needs.
Organizationally successful occupations o-f nuclear plant sites at Wyhl and
Kaiseraugst, for example, have raised public consciousness, and have moreover resulted in administrative court victories for -protesters (Nelkin and Pollack, pp. 6164; Aubert; 1982, p. 143). They have even contributed to discussions of.possible _
Pershing II and Cruise Missile site occupations in 1983 among mor~ militant,
anti-armament facttons, according to i ntervie\'1S conducted by this author~ _
The integration and _adaptation of past learning experiences to new "struggle·"
contexts poses a third question, namely, what is the longer-tenn significance of·
protest in the .eighties, ·;n contrast to earlier movements? After 20+ years of·
_leftist-inspired activism the participants themselves are developing a sense of the
evolutionary character of th_ese movements, which are def_inable in terms of
..••. a social process that unfolds in a situational context. · Protest groups .
- emerge as a result of structural changes in society and as a movement develops, its organization,-ideologies, and tactics adapt to the environmental·
and political circumstances in which it evolves. In the course of broadening- its constituency and developing its strategies, a social movement also:
becomes a source of further structu_ral change, though often in directions.
:that may be neither anticipated nor intended (Nelkin and Pollack, p. 6).
References to social evolution and. structural change ~ g_ do not provide
complete -answers to a fourth important question, as _to why political malcontents
of the eighties have resorted to ever more. violent forms of protest. _Violence and
11
direct action 11 have become the rule rather than .the exception, especially among
elements of .the squatters' arid culture-center scenes -- in other words, among those
not yet of voting age. · More violent outbursts have in turn been accompanied by the
"criminalization 11 of a ~ider range of nonconventional forms of participation by
state officials. The proclivity toward violence can neither be simply_ interpreted·
as an outflow of excess libidinal energy. among adolescents, nor glibly.. ascribed to
failed ~xperiments in anti-authoritarian education.- Further, it is .not merely the
product of poor police-community relations, as some have tried to argue in explain-·
ing the Brixton •riots, for example (Scannan, .1981). One hypothesis worth exp1 ori rig
is that the guerilla~warfare mentality now common to innercity unrest offers a.de~
layed confinnation of Marcuse's prognosis on the rise of 11 surplus repression 11 (Marcuse, 1972, p. 52). ihe violence is sooner rooted.-in the complex.nature of pressing socio-economic problems; the spread of violence poses a threat ,ta the stability
of th~ system and hence requires a spetifically political interpretation.
Charles iilly's analysis on the role of collective violence in Western Europ-ean: political development suggests the existence of a "standard cycle" that leads
to a fusion of social protest and structural change. Historically,

•a relatively

integrated traditional society breaks up under the stress
and movement of industrialization, the stress and movement stimulate a

-4wide variety of violent reactions -- at first chaotic, but gradual1y acquiring a measure of coherence. New means of control and ways of reintegrating the displaced segments of the population into an orderly social
life eventually develop, and finally a mature industrial society held together by widespread, genera11y pacific political participation emerges •
.In such a theory, the stimulus to co1lective violence comes largely from
the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart
(Tilly, 1979, p. 87).
.
Perhaps the cycle repeats
trial i zation.

itself under the "stress and movement 11 of post-i ndus-

Violent forms of protest are r.ot merely the by~product of industrialization
·an.d social displacement; rather, they derive from new struggles over established
positions in the political structure of power. Tilly maintains that·
Even presumably nonpolitical forms of co11ective violence ••. are normally
directed against the authorities, accompanied by a critique of the authorities' meeting of their responsibilities, and informed ·by a s.ense of
jQstice denied to the participants in the process (Tilly, p. 87).
As a direct challenge to authorities, ·violent protest may be seen to accompany and
complement more organized, peaceful efforts by the aggrieved to reaiize their own
political obj~ctives. Violent protest functions as a metering device with respect
to perceived political legitimacy.
··
A -fifth question worthy.of consideration involves the special role of ado1escent protest, a new class of "pro-anarchy/no future" citizens, whose first direct
contact.with the state is mpre likely to have been a burst of tear-gas rather than
a trip to the ballot box. Youth in the postwar period has become a powerful metaphor for social change, the personification of new life-styles and values -- which
consequently poses another direct challenge to the existing authority structure.
But the position of youth in post-industria1 society arid its prospects for selfactualization have also under:-gone a radical transformation. In a study of post
World Wai II youth subcultures, British sociblogists h~ve noted that
in the 1950 1 s, •youth' came to symbolise the most advanced point of social
change· .•• youth was the vanguard party ... soci a 1 change was seen as generally beneficial ('you've never-had it so good') ••• in the early 1960 1 s, the most visible and identifiable youth groups were involved in dramatic
events which triggered off 'moral panics', focusing, ·in displaced fonn,
society'_s 'quarrel with itself' .• ·• Ir. this crisis of authority, youth now
played the role of symptom and scaoeaoat (-Hall and Jefferson, 1982, pp.
71 ~72).
The late 1960 1 s gave way to counter-cu1ture, student protest and street poli- tics; you,th lost its reputation as a positive agent for change and acquired the
image of a subversive minority, which the Law and Order Society sought to control.
Economic recession, educational reforms gone haywire and rising unerr:ployment figures
in the 1970's and 1980 1 s have since ascribed to youth a much more static role -as a case for sccial workers and psychotherapists (Oltmann, 1980, pp. 40-45;
Giesecke, 1981, p. 6)~ Alienated, unemployed adolescents moreover serve as living
proof that politicians have failed to meet their social responsibilitiesj i.e. by
not fulfilling their electora1 promises- of equal opportunity and sustained economic
grm>1th (Frackmann, et_tl., 1981, pp. 7-_9).
Last but not least, an overvie,,., _of ~est Europe2.n Social movements rriust also
inquire as to the 11 meaning" of protest for the: political system cs a whole. This
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raises questions regarding the effects of protest on the understanding of democ. racy in specific national contexts. It further questions the long term prospects
for _{ re)integrating individual activists into the estab1 ished political ins ti tu- .
tions. Political socialization research points to party identification as the area .
in which early'.'."instill~d political preferences are most likely to persist {Ingleharts
1971, p. 992). The proliferation of "alternative" parties, combined with a strong
anti-politics orientation among the youngest generation of protesters may indeed
become an important source o_f stru_ctural change.
IL

THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS:

WHO'S PROTESTING

WHATi

.
A major survey sponsored by the German Shell Corporation confirmed that "Youth
· '81" evinces 1i ttl e of the dynamism, optimism or the care-freeness one would_ expect
of those to whom "the future 11 allegedly belongs. Of· the 1075 15-24 year olds interviewed, 95 percent do not believe that wars will. one day cease to plague the
human race; nor do 95 percent believe that it is.possible tq create a secure, worryfree s~ciety~ ·At least 80 percent anticipate a future of scarce resources, economic
crises and famines; 78 percent hold human equality for an unatta-inable goal; 76 percent· presume that chemistry and technology will indeed destroy the environment
{Jugendwerk, 1981, p. 384). If the prospects are really so grims then there is a
m~asure of political realism in youth's depiction of itself as the No Future Generation. Hence, the young peop.le's claim that "we want everything and indeed subito"
(Giesecke, 1981).
· A.

Dimens1on 11 Depol iticfzation" and the Drive ror Autonomous Youth Centers (AJZ)

In contrast to the· anti-imperialis:t, ariti-Vietnam campaigns of the l960's,
movements of -.the 1980' s are unique in their c9mbination of "traditional II protest
activities {demonstrations) with a multitude of concrete, pragmatic efforts to develop new work-and~life-styles . {Giesecke, p. 4). The domi.nant theme is "No Power
tQ .. No One.II Activists•· negative orientation _to politics, fused with a preference
. for bizarre, counterctiltural behavior underlines the importance of problems and
-contradictions for which money provides no solution. This refocusing on values
·(human closeness, individual free<lom) becomes a source of great discomfort to established.powers conmitted to efficiency and ·technocratic expertise.·· Their lan·. guage is decidedly anti-ideological, ant-i-intel lectual -- 1.ec delights in grammatica11y incorrect wordplay -- and even the -New Socialization Type: Student is
consciously inimi ca 1 to II theory. 11
·
·
.The anti-politics orientation derives from a recognition that gaps between
theory and practice are. the rule rather than the exception. Criticism is not directed against the abstract values of a majoritarian·society {freedom, social justice); protesters question instead whether it is possible for Big Politics to develop a clear orientation to these values. Secondly., the apolitical behavior of .
the younger generation st~s from experience; the under-aged are powerless in their
efforts to exercise political influence through normal channels.· Thirdly, not only
the content of politics, but also the manner in-which politicians and administrators dea-1 .with citizens is perceived as destructive to the individual •. Fourth, the
web of bureaucratic rules and regulations concentrates more on the security of the
state than on the protection of citizens; final decisions are more sensitive to
jurid.ic_al imperatives than to individual needs. Fifth, the image of future society
is one based on a single set of values; crlteria and behaviors, brought into harmony
with technological development. The majority culture denies minority and alternative cultures the right to exist. - Protesters reject the notion that alternative
·. valu.es may apply in the personal sphere a_s long as majoritarian standards prevail ·
· in the productive.sector. Further," the commitment to large-scale political11 organiz,.,
atians has resulted in a "leveling" of social problems and a 11 monotonizing of
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culture. Moreover, the special problems of youth~- the need for more humane
schools _and better vocational training, high youth unemployment anp the shortage
of affordable, decent housing -- have been exploited for electoral purposes, but
subsequently ignored by office-holders. Finally, younger people feel ·that they have
been denied a chance to organize themselves and to learn from their own mistakes •
. "Youth pol icy" has been conducted for, but not in comnunication with those most
.. affected (Giesecke, 1981).
··
.
,

'

The struggles involved in the efforts to create autonomous youth centers (AJZ)
in Switzerland and Germany (which can only be summarized here) lend an empirical
base to these criticism. The AJZ activists express a commitment to principles of
self-responsibility and grass-roots democracy; they militate against the coldness
of established,· subsidized culture •. "Pack Ice" and "Concrete" images symbolize the
sterility and lack of individual wannth of the dominant culture •. Leitmotif: "Too
bad concrete doesn•t burn."
The drive to establish special centers in Switzerland began with· the fonnation of the Initiative Conunittee for a Zurich Youth House in 1949. Various fund
raising activities were instigated by adolescent groups through the fifties and
netted a center fund of Fr. 800,000 by 1960, while city fathers argued over a pos·. sible site. In 1968, the younger generation took_ to the streets several ,times to
express its' impatience; the June Anti-Pol ice and Globus demonstrations resulted
in violent physical confrontations. Attempts to "occupy 11 buildings were unsuccessful, until the City Council agreed in 1977 to provisional centers in the Rote Fabrik
and Schindlergut, both in need of substantial renovation. Large scale protests
.· oc,curred frequent1y over the next three years, culminating in a demonstration of
8,000 on June 21, 1980. Shortly thereafter, officials announced a decision to provide· a credit of 60 mill ion Franken for renovation of the Zurich 0,pera House. On
June• 28, politicians consented to an Autonomous Youth Center in the l immatstrasse,
to the. tune of Fr. 40,000. · Unrest continued throughout the sunvner, spreading to
Bern·anq Basel. A September 4 police raid on the·center,led, to a ·find of 230 grams
of hashish, a quantity of "powder resembling heroin," 2 pistols and an air gun,
resulting in the immediate closing of the AJZ. On September 8, the local council
:approved a Fr. 170,000 expendittire for a new high-pressure waterhose. In November,
• . an· EidgenBssische Kormnission published its Theses on the Causes of Youth Unrest,
openly denounced by Zurich's Educational Superintendent, Alfred G1 lgen. (Rowald,
1981, p. 133). By January, 1981, 1400 demonstrators were subjected to criminal investigation. The AJZ was reopened in April, 1981, under the sponsorship of the
Social Democratic Party and a church-related group, Pro Juvente, with a subsidy of
one million Franken; it closed again a few months later owing to drug traffic. On
March 23, 1981, the building in the Limmatstrasse was demolished; the site remains
empty -- all physica·l reminders that politicians failed to deal effectively with
youth problems in Zurich have literally been eliminated.
Confrontations at the Youth Center Komm in Nuremberg may have been less prolo,nged, but the results. have been no lessdepressing for urban adolescents. What
Zurich youth sought for decades to acquire had come into being some eight years
ago, .under the auspices of a relatively progressive SPD Cultural Director, Hermann
.Glaser. The Communication Center, not far from McDonald's, had an annual budget of
DM 600,000, of which OM 210,000 was spent on four full-time secretaries, programs
and advertising. For the CSU Opposition in City Hall, Komm served.as an "Agitation
Center" and a "switchboard for rabblerousersl' (Aust, 1981, p. 67). Korran visitors
were known to arrange discussions on drug-and-squatter-related problems, and many
no doubt had personal connections to "the scene~"
In February, 1981, Bavarfan CSU Minister President Franz Josef Strau_ss advised
. his Interior Minister Tandler to adopt a· hard line against youth unrest, in 1ight

-7of "the serious transgressions of the rioting, brutal chaotics in Berl in, Frankfurt,
G8tti ngen and Hamburg 11 (Aust, p. 6'2). It became standard procedure by March
to station several pol ice units around the Center every time a special event was
scheduled. On Friday, March 5, in spite of a cityfathers 1 Verbot, two Dutch guests
showed a film deal in~ with squatter developments in Amsterdam, to which the police
sent a number of V-Manner (from the Constitutional_ Protection Office) to record the
discussion on the tactical use of for'ce. A spontaneous disturbance involving about
150-200 exiting.youngsters broke out after 25 vans of police attempted to block off
surrounding streets; the majority then sought asylum back in Ko~m. At 3:30 a.m. 164
occupants were taken· into police custody, against 141 of whom identical.criminal ·
charges were filed. Many were transported to detention centers in Bayret1th or Munich,
their parents first informed after the weekend (DIE ZEIT, 11. December 1981). Reports indicate that at least 70 adolescents were known to ·have been drinking tea,
playing chess or listening tb music ai the time of arrest (Aust, p. 72). The first
trial proce~dings in November, 1981,/wer_e postponed when important evidentiary police
trans·cripts·suddenly 11 disappeared 11 (DIE ZEIT, 2. Aprir 1981). Due to controversy_over
"legal irregularities•• in the select~on of judges, a substantial number hadyet to
be tried by 1ate spring of 1982.
I
·
If established politician Franz/ Joseph Strauss sees fit to summ~rize his reaction to youth disturba_nces with th,e phrase, "Democratization is the beginning of
anarchy" (Howald, p.193); when the President of the Zurich tity Council announces
to _thousands gathered in front of c;:ty Hall, 11 00 not take it for granted that w_e ·
have to comS= out here" to discuss th~ demonstrators• demands, it comes as no surp~ise that they sh~uld lose fafth in/ the political process.
The 11 depoliticization 11 of youthi protest.has two components. _The first involves
disinterest in the established politjical system, which is expected to prevail among
the youngest; _as part of the life-cyjcle effect. A 1977 Shell study shows this to be
especially true in Germany (Table I).
-

Expresse1d I_nterest in Politics (In Percent) - ·

Table I:
Question:

How sttjong is your interest i~ politics?
!

I
Somewhat

Age

Very
Group Country Strong

Strong

interested

I

2
3

, 12-13
years

l
0

2
l

24
14

2

2

FRG

4

Fr.

2
3

13
8
10

17-18
years
22-23
years

FRG

Fr. -

GB

FRG
GB .Fr.

tlo
- No
interest Response

I

Germany
Total
- Sample Britain·
France

GB

Hardly ir.teresteQ

3

4
3
3

9
5
10

13
6
20

/35
23
!30
1

26

17

. 11

26
50
46

l

3
l

41

2
7

16

29
17
11

68

2

-134
126
36
I

26
18
12

23
43
39

1

46 30
fO

24
17
12

62

13
· 43 .
26

2
0

.,,,.,

Number

100
100
100

1006.
904
940

10.0
100
100

333
308
332

100
100
100

332
- •307
342

0 - - 100
1
100
0 -·.-100

341
289
266

Source: Jugendwerk d~r Deutschen ~hen, Hrsg. JUGam Ill. EUROPAIHRE EINGLEIDERUr,G
HI DIE HELT DER ERWACHSENH), Band I1I, Hamburg: JDS, !977. p. 77.
_. - . - - _

_

The second component involve~ an ac~i ve distrust, manifested ,n· an unwi 11 i ngn·ess to
join political organizations /of anyl sort; distrust is more likely to be a ~unction
of negative experiences, now: being made by ever younger members of the· pol, ty. _ As
Table II indicates, these early expbriences may counteract_ family-instilled political preferences and, consequently, kliminate the rationale for party identification

-8Table II: Party Participation (!n Percent)
Question: Would ycJ like to become a member
of a political party?

Age

.. roup
· Totai
Sample
12··]3
years
17-18
years
22-23
.years

Country
FRG

GB
Fr.

FRG
GB
Fr.

Most
Certainly

Possibly

Probably
not

Very
improbable

t:o
response

3
2

20

32
26

44
56
58

10
13

7
13

6

·11

3
1

16
4

31
23

3

9

GB

3
4

22

Fr.

8

15

FRG

5
3

21
8
15

FRG

r.a

Fr.

Source:
pp. 77.

9

6

so

0

.,,.

Number

100
100
100

1M6

100

333
308
332

904
940-

6

53
53

1
20
30

100

33

42

0
5

100
100

322

4

100

342

0

100
100
100

3i, 1
2B9

27
13

55
59

33

41
59
62

2£

14

3
3

l('IQ,

207

266

Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, Hrsg. JUGE~D IN EUROPA, -Band II, 1977.
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among the young. The Institut fur Oemoskopie in Allensbach has reported that of 5.4
;nillion.German 17-23 year olds, 700,000 are dropouts, 2.7 miliion are disillusioned
with domestic condftions and 1.13 million (21 percent) have no intention of voting
(STERN, Nr. 38/1979). There is something much more fundamental than 11 the end of
ideology 11 at stake, and the spray-painted anarchy symbol has appeared in a11 major
European cities. Is this an era of 11 No Pol itics 11 for a 11 No Future" generation?
8.

Cimer:sior: "Post-~·~ateria1ism 11 and the Pursuit of Happiness Among the. Squatters

An active distrust of politics is a trait.shared by AJZ protesters and members
of the Hausbesetzer scene. The squatters differ from center supporters in that
their search for solidarity extends beyond weekends and recreational periods. Given
the hours invested in squatter-council discussions, physical repair,mrk and constant
efforts to avoid forceful eviction by police, the occupation of houses becomes "a
real full-time job" .;:._ with overtime (Aust, p. 11).
The idea is to live better with less, to arrange satisfying work-and-living
conditions, rather than to overcompensate one's Frust through consumptio~. Collective action becomes a key weapon against social isolation. The question is
whether the 15-24 year olds really have a choice regarding the idea of "living with
less. 11 They feel marginalized by their Not-Yet-Status, see few prospects for becoming affluent adu1ts. Their only positive role is Youth-as-Consumer. In the Federal
Republic, the 12-21 year olds reportedly have a purchasing potential of OM 18 billion per month -- those 1ucky enough to have jobs (01 tmanns, 1981, p. 25) ..
11

11

Youth unemployment has reached catastrophic proportions in Great Britain,
where it is estimated that one half of all school-leavers in 1982 will be without
jcbs, and that less than 50 percent of thbse 16-17 year olds eligible for the new
Youth Training Scheme in 1983 wi1i ffod permanent positions (House of ComIT1ons, 1982,
p. 22). The picture is not nearly so grim in Switzerland, where jab market pressures
have been relieved at least temporarily by the decision to send home one million
guestworkers in the mid-1970 s. S1-Jiss youth may fa.ce .a waiting pericd up to two
years for highly desired apprenticesh1ps; but they are available. The German statistics on youth unemp_loyment fall in bet\'l'een, though the outlook is far from
1

-9=
Table III.
Year/Month
• September 1967
September 1970
September 1973
September 1975
September- 1977
September 1978
September 1979
September 1980

15-20
Nur.:ber
19,212
7,522
20,960
115,753
105,900
92,030
· 68,593
81,055

Unemployed Youth. Ages·1s-20 and 20-25, in
the Federal. Republic of Germany.
Percent
0.8 0.4
1.1
6.2

20-25
Number
24,322 ·
- 10,653
30,041
.171,620

s.r
.4.4
3.1
3.5.

161,?73
153,93~
123, 709· -

143,526

Percent
1.0
0.4
1.1
6.5
6.2
5.a

4.5

-

Percent General
· Unemel oyment
1.6
b.4
1.0
4.4
4.0
.3~8

,3.2
3~5

Source: Margrit Frackmarin, et al. NULL BOCK -o □ER MUT ZUR ZUKUNFT?
IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1981. p. 154
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encouraging~ as Table III illustrates. Though Gennan rates are not high in in-.
ternational comparison, historical experiences with unemployment and inflation add
weight - to the problem -(Scharpf -.--et al., 1982). - -.
.

.

-

,.

,•

The number of Gennans aged -15-30 increased between·1975 and 1980 from 1.7 mil:..
lion to 13.8 million; by 1985 this age group_of potential job-hunters will add
another 1. 7 mil lion.· Official unemployment figures among those under twenty reached
90,000 in the surrmer of 1981; an estimated.200,000 have notyet found suitable apprenticeships (Frackmann, 1981, p. 33, p. 42). Among the children of foreign work-.
ers, onJy 40,000 of the 160,000 15-19· year olds are completing vocational training
(Frackmann, p •.68) •. The alternatives may be fatal. Reimar Oltmanns reports that
over 150,000 young Germans have joined religious cults; 80,000 are known to be narcotics addicts, with-the wor1d's Number One heroin-death rate of 600·annually;
180,000 still in.school regularly consume alcohol; 300,000 have juveni.le criminal
records; some 3 mi11ion suffer serious psychological problems; and by 1979, the number of suicides in the 15-25 group topped 1500 annually (Oltmanns, pp. 40-43).
·Another alternative, communal living experiments based on the illegal ·occup~~
tion of vacant buildings, has attracted political attention because of the violence
generally asso~iated ~lith the evictions. Despite their image as storm-trouping anarchists, the squatters actually co~prise~at least four distinct groups: 1) the
urban-political elements, cultivating cooperative efforts among city planners, architects_, social workers and tenant organizations (Mieterinitiativen); 2) self-proclaimed.supporters .of the Punk, 11 Sponti 11 and Anarcho-Scenes; 3) individuals attracted
out of 11 existential necessity", including l509-3000 drug addicts, .runaways and homeless; 4) political trend-followers and sympathizers, students,. apprentices and :intellectual part~timers (Giesecke, p. 17}.
The illegal take-overs and make-overs by young activists are justified on the
basis of genuine shortages of affordable, 11 livable 11 housing in major urban centers.
Protest against planned obsolescense and land speculation on the part of owners and
developers also p1ays_ a role. In Frankfurt (known to the scene as Bankfurt or Krankfurt); 1000 luxury apartments stand empty, while 20,500 people are registered as ·
"homeless" (Haller, 1981, p. 77). In Zurich, where the occupations have a more limited, symbolic function, a one room apartment easily corr:mands a monthly rent of
Fr. 1000-2000, circa $500-$1000 (Ho~ald, ~- 154).
The Amsterdam Kraakers (the sound of a bolted ~oar being opened~ith an iron
wedge) have served as a role model for would-be squatters across the continent. As
earlyas 1971, the Dutch HighCourt guaranteed already settled activists a legal

-10"right to peaceful occupancy, 11 making prevention of take-overs the main focus of
police activity. Over 10,000 apartments have been occupied in 10 years by 30,000
people; over 60,000 "hardship cases" continue to search for suitable dwellings.
The squatters tend to enjoy widespread support,.despite the shockwaves produced by
violence during the· investiture of Queen Beatrix in April, 1981 (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, May 2, 1981). The Kraakers c1aim to have learned valuable organizational
lessons during the "Brokdcrf-conditioning" days; that Dutch squatters also participate in anti-nuclear energy demonstra_tions "can be taken for granted" (Ha11er, p.
131).
West Berlin, Nikolas Ritter argues, 11 has a good ch.a.nee of becoming the DropOut City of Western Europe: (DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 11/1979). That Berlin has more
Hausbesetzungen than any other German Land is due to the fact that the housing
shortage is a1so more extreme (TAGESSPIEGEL, 31. July 1982). A major construction
scandal that forced Major Dietrich Stobbe s resignation in 1980 only underlined
squatters 1 cynicism regarding SPD promises to remedy the problem. Interim Reigning
Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel was relatively successful in reestablishing local peace on
the basis of his 11 Berlin Line" policy. Building owners were requ.ired to provide
concrete proof and irmiinent dates of renovation plans before evictions would be
undertaken. The Berlin government meanwhile attempted to arrange for 11 property-use
contracts" between fodividual households and landlords. Popular sympathy initial_ly
fested with the squatters, especially in neighborhoods where urban renewal was long
overdue and the trade union controlled developing company Neue Heimat was engaging·
in legally questionable tactics (Schindele, 1980). Despite Vogel 1 s short-term success, the saliency of the housing catastrophe and the list of policy failures in
other a~eas was too long to prevent the SPOls def~at in the 1981 special elections.
1

This city of L9 mjllion inhabitants was found tb have over 800 empty apartment buildings in various stages of decay by the late seventies, along wi'th 1500-··
2000 individuals without leases and 40,000 register~d as "urgently ~n need" of
housing (Haller, p. 105). In the Kreuzberg neighborhood alone, of the 16,000 rental
units requiring major repairs in 1963, 2,400 had been torn dm•m, 1400 n2v.1~1 ccnstructed and 14 renovated by 1973 (Aust, p. 30). According to official statistics,
248 buildings have been occup·ied since 1979; 727 persons are .11 registered squatters 11
in 30-40 core houses (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. July 1982). The new CDU Mayor Richard van"
WeizsMcker promised to uphold the 11 Berlin Line, 11 after assuming office in May, 1981.
Nevertheless, the number of forceful evictions has increased dramatically over the
last year, and the remainder are subject to frequent 11 searches 11 by the po1ice. As
of August, 1982, the number of besetzte H~user stdod at 123. Since 1979, pol{ce have
11
investigated 11 1600 persons and initiated 5791 court proceedings in conjunction with
eviction-related street battles (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. Ju1y 1982).
·
Conditions in the occupied buildings are genera11y quite primitive; many lack
windows and doors, most lack showers; private toilets and depend on coal ovens for
heat. More important for these urban protesters, however, is the chance to create
their own space and develop their own life-styles. The 11 period effects 11 of a declining economy are likely to have a much stronger impact on the value preferences of
yolng squatters than on well-housed adults, owing t~ t~eir greater economic vulnerability.

fi. high lei/el of perceived physical irsecurity could, in theory, lead to a re-·
ne\·1ed intc:rc:st in r::att::rialist values. In fact, InglEhart h3.s alreo.dy registered a
decl 1ne in the ratio of Post-Matcriu1ists to Mat8rial ists in the youngest group
surve/ed beb'leen -1973 and 1976 (Inglehart, 1981, p. 888). The shift a111ay from Post-.
Naterialisiu,· hc~cver) cannot be interpreted as a ~ain for the Materialist camp.
Insiler:2tt 2.~ i.:es th~,t i:,scc 17"ity has r2ce:1tly arrested the.spre.:d of Post-'.(2teri-.
a1isir,, l~adi g t~J 2. r:::ncv!ed t~::~;:h~i:::is on rc~industrieli:c1tio:: and rea.r~arr:ent. H~ fails
:J ~~~~~~n t ai 'tis th2 01~2~, est3blished gencr~ticn that is 2gain supp~rting
1••

-11these goals at the policy-making- level. As the 1981 Shell survey demonstrates, -there
is still a high degree.of commitment to environmental protection, greater individual
freedom, support for women's rights and the peace movement among youth~ This sug.,..
gests that there are perhaps two classes of Post-Materialists: those aged 25-34 who
have "made it,'-' are now established in careers and can devote their energies to political causes; and those who are under_25 who are r~signed to not attaining satisfying. professions and expensive possessions, who have opted for a more extr.eme· set
of anti-materialistic values. Could this be the geheration of Post-Post-Materialists?
C. _Dimension "Nationalism" and the Advent of European Racism
~

-

.

.

.

- Throughout the sixties; the repression of blacks _in the United States was a
common topic and stimulus to 11 anti-Americanist 11 sentiments among elements of the
_ European Left. Students as-well as tra9e unionists ·also stood more or' less united
in their opposition to_ exploitation of Third World workers by the multinational car..:
poratfons. The influx-of foreign student~ at European universities, along wiih the
importation of _guestworkers in the mid-sixties, was co_nstrued_ as a fonn of development assistance, which, of course, conveniently served domestic economic n~eds._ The
physical presence of these foreigners undeniably raised consciousness w_ith respect
to the plight of the Third World. The llguests 11 appear to hav_e worn out their wel-_
come~ In light of. serious economic crises in the developed counties, the continued
presence of Asians, Africans and Turkish nation~1$ has ~reduced psychological as
well as complex socio-economic problems for the host nations.
·
The p_roblem of racism is intimately connected to the resurgence of right-wing
groups.and nee-nationalism. Surprisingly, however, ulta rightist, racist tendencies
are finding expression among different age groups in Great Britain and in the Federal Republic. In both cases, though,. economic: insecurity seems to lie at the base.
Non"."'nationals are increasingly viewed as illegitimate competitors in the struggle
for ·access· to scarce housing and job opportunities.
Great Britain, the textbook case of a democratic, albeit ltdeferential society,"
experienCed major outbursts· in nine cities during July of 1981, and additional unrest in Toxteth/Liverpool iri July, 1982. The disturbances were triggered by racerelated incidents. Having stalwartly shouldered "the white man's burden" through the nineteenth century, Britain has proved unprepared to conquer the problems posed
by th,e influx of New Commonwealth citizens in the mid-twentieth century. Unlike the
guestworkers-in Germany on temporary visas, the Afro-Caribbean and Asian residents
cannot be sent home, many of the youngest constituting the third. generation. Little
attention was paid to integration schemes through the fifties and sixties. Since
1968, ·the focus has been on legislative devices geared to restricting future immigration -- in a country where it ,s "still respectable in the House of Commons'' to describe ethnic minorities as "aliens" and 11 aenetica1ly different" (Behrens,' 1982,
p. 126). Since the seventies; attention has turned to Law and Order Legislation,
i.e. the 11 sus 11 law, in.effect affording police and-the courts much discretion in.
respond,ng to delinquency among young· blacks (Husband, 1982, ·pp. 304-305; Hall and
Jefferson, pp. 73-74).
The Southall demonstration of April 23-24, 1979, i.n the public's eye;-is classified ·as ·an incident distir.ct from confrontations between ethnic groups and police
through the summer of 1981. In this case, sympathy fell to the Asian community in
its reaction to unprovoked acts of white racism. A variety cf Asian-Indian, community and youth groups planned a peaceful sitdown before the_ Town Hall to protest
an election meeting of the ul tra'."'right National Front Party there. The aggressive
behavior. of the police toward those intent on a "march for unity and peace" dealt
a severe shock to the comr:unity as a i,i1hole, ~1hich was relatively well-int~grated
(Dummett, 1980, pp. 7-15).

-12The National Front Party, formed in 1967, pursued a political program centered
on 11 racial purity" and other values repugnant to British democracy. Up until 1979 5
the NF neverthe 1ess adhered to demo era tic ru1 es and procedures (Husband, p. 261).
The 1979 elections were. proc1aimed to be 11 a supreme test". of right-wing strength.
The resu1ts weredisasterous, 1.6 percent for the NF, even outdistanced by th1: new
Ecc 1ogy Party (Taylor in NEW COMMUNITY, No.· 2, Autumn, 1981). The NF then abandoned
its democratic tactics in favor of physical attacks on the Asian community, so severe that the Home Office felt obliged to commission a special investigation .(Home
Office, 1981).

These developments created a framework of tension for the Srixton 'disorders of
April 10-12, 1981. The riots were set off when police attempted to assist a joung
black whom they thought had been stabbed. As crowds began to gather, rumors spread.
that the police had inflicted the injury. Over two days of rioting, burning and
looting, 7,4t2 police were brought into a community genera11y serviced by 710 (NEW
SOCIETY, 3. December 1981). The nation breathed a s·igh of relief when the publication of Lord Scarman I s Report in November provided an Offi ci a 1 Answer to the causes
of unrest. This report, which focused on event~ in only one of four wards, sa~ the
main problem in poor communication between the police and the black community; the
fact that white youths sided with the blacks in three other wards and uptown lcoting·was overlooked (Interview with MP John Tilley, former Shadow Minister of Race
Relations). Other factors .. general unemployment in Brixton which stood at.13 percent,
fer blacks under 19 at 55 percent and homelessness among 200=300 blacks, were men- ·
tioned as "background" (Scarman, 1981, pp. 25-27). Lord Scarman regretted the re- ·
sults of "delay and lack of vigour," 11 unimaginative and inflexible policing 11 (Scarman, pp. 100-101). He concluded: 111 Institutional racism• does not exist in Britain:
but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial discrimination, have not
yet been eliminated" (Scarman, p. 209_1.
·
Racist senti;-;-;ents and attraction to ultra-right~ neo-nazi groups are a 1ongstanding tradition -among white wor'.dng c1ass youths in t"'.e '~K. :he "Teddy !3o'ys''
were the recognized instigators of the 1958 Nottingham face-riots (Hall and Jefferson, p. 83). The "skin-heads 11 of the late sixties emerged from the rapidly worsening economic situation among the lo.wer working class stratum. The intensified feeling of Us-Them led to a search for solidarity,along 11 territorial 11 lines. These selfproclaim_edllMobs11 cultivated a collective, macho identity, for which footba11 and
the particu1ar brand of violence associated with mass sporting events provided an
arena for expression (Ha11 and Jefferson, p. 101). Their own sports, 11 Paki-8ashing 11
.and 11 Queer-Bashing, 11 entailed ritualized attacks on the corrmunity 1 s most obvious
scapegoats and gained in popularity following the NF's electoral fiasco of 1979.
Officials generally feared renewed white outbursts as the youth unemployment pie-.
ture continued .to darken.
·

In

1979 a split occurred among the ultra rightists~ the 30-40 year olds continu..,.
inf their support of the National Front as a non-constitutional movement with a
strong pro-police orientation. The younger elements gravitated to the British Movement, which has adopted a more anti-police stance-and has acquired functions akin
to a 11 Youth Club. 11 The NF has not dared to make waves in Brixton since 1978 (Interview with MP Ti11ey). Right-wing potential nonetheless remains anchored in the
younger 11 1umpenpro 1etari at. 11

-Renewed efforts to organize ar.:ong .right-i•dng extremists in the Federal Republic are also characterized by a growing animosity toward foreigners
(Ausl;nderfeindlichkeft), especially toward Turkish nationals. The Shell survey
nonetheless holds that only one percent of the.15-24 year olds identify with and 3
percent find the nee-nationalistic grot,Jps 11 very good, 11 while 33 percent of the
sample are prepared. to "struggle against 11 and 41 percent 11 dislike 11 these g-r-cups
(,w·ua-r.a'•.,ey,
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backgrounds. A .1979-Bl Berlin survey of 1_60,000. school children found 60: eighth to
tenth graders clas_sified_ as ultra-right (TAGESSPIEGEL, 10. July 1982). Given, a dif·ferent historical burden, German political leaders have taken an active interest in
counteracting radical-right tendencies, especial_ly fn the schools. The· Berlin SPD
devoted a full day of discussion tc the relation between youth unemployment, limited
historical knowledge of the Holocaust ·and anti_-democratic tendencies among. those
_ under 18 (TAGESSPIEGEL, 2. July 1982).
Anyone familiar with the West German music scene ·is likely to have trouble digesting the findings of Shel] without a substantial dose of Morton's product, how-·
ever. The punks, bikers, rockabillys, the heavy metal and new wave groups echo a
very different refrain: 11 you never· get bored when you I re frightened. 11 At the Punk I s
version of "the Met!' -- Berl in 1 s Metropol -- the less empty beer cans thrown at performers, the ·more appreciated the II sound" is judged t_o be. Texts are brutal and- contain strong fascist overtones, especially among the New German Wave. But these are
not Nazis in the traditional sense. As one concert promoter stressed, 11 they look
like Hitler Youth, they are Hitler Youth, only they don't know who Hitler was. 11 .
Moreover, "the record companies go along without skruples; as long as they can-make
good money 11 · (DIE-ZElT, 16. July 1982). The shift in musical taste involves another
ironic, nationalist twist. After three decades of domination by the·American rockmarket, _new wave bands are out to reject "foreign" music, helping Gennan recording
finns out of the recession in the process. Researchers_ at the Heidelberg Sinus-Institut take the musical metaphors seriously, having conducted -a:-survey in which 40
. percent of the 14-18 year olds would 11 tolerate 11 the neo-nazis (DIE NEUE, 9-. J~ly.
1982).
.
.
.
- As a: recrui bnent "source and battleground,. the schoo 1s are also important to ·
the neo-nazi party, the NP0. A 11 citizen initfative 11 calling itself Aktion .A.uslHnder
-Stopp has appeared before the ~lorthrhein.:.westphalen Constitutional Court far its '
efforts to impose the principle of 11 native language instructio·n 11 in grade· schools.
Limited access to German higher education and professions would presumably increase
guestworkers 1 wi11ingness to return home. Heading the drive is an engineering professor from Hagen, a known NPD ward leader (DIE ZEIT, 28. May 1982). Fifteen other
university professors have signed. the .Heidelberg Manifesto of 17. June 1981, protesting the "infiltration of the German folk by fore-igners, 11 espe"Cially Turkish residents unwilling to assimilate (DIE ZEIT, 12. February 1982). In contrast to Brita in, organized nee-nationalist potential. in Germany seems to be stronger among
older, more established strata.
·
The Federal Center for Political ·Education -recently· published a free brochure,
projecting that the departure of 4,629,800 foreign workers would· open up 1.9 million jobs. It then demonstrated that most of the Germans,_curre_ntly unemployed would
be unqualified, i.e. for work in the mines, construction and automobile industries
(TAGESSPEIGEL, 2. July 1982). The guestworkers and their children have maintained a
low profile during the periods of urban unrest, although the problems of youth unemployment and substandard housing affect them most directly.· Berl in-Kreuzber9 has
becorr.e a 11 Little lstanbul 11 of 80,000; already one fourth o.f Berlin 1_s school-aged
children are of Tufkish parentage. Although the weTcom~ mat wa~ rolled up five years
ago, less than 4 percent of these families are now interested in returning to the
homeland (T.A.GESSPIEGEL, 28. July 1982).
The low profile has not prevented .the rise .of antipathy towards these especially
hard-to-assimilate aliens. The Godesberg Institute for Applied Social Sciences found
-that 49 percent-of the FRG· citizens are hostile towards the foreign presence, 22
percent are ambivalent. Those who admitted to~prejudice tended to have no direct
contact, yet considered th ems elves 11 we 11 enough i nformed 11 about the guestworkers 1
plight. Antipathy increased in relation to the age of those interviewed; it correlated negatively with higher levels of education, however. The majority of respon-

-14dents under 20, most likely to experience competition for scarce jobs, were 11 friendly11 in their orientations, 65 percent •Of those expressing hostility were retired individuals •. Among academics, 28 percent were sooner negative:; of those with only grade
schco 1 educations, 60 percent were disposed toward hos tin ty. Meanwhi1 e, the state
government in Stuttgart has purchased 1000 Deutschland-Ober;..Alles record albums for
distribution in Baden-Wurttemberg schools, and a 197,g Bavarian Law requires all
would-be teachers to learn the entire text of the national hymn by heart (Oltmanns,
p • 80)

•
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Both Great Britain and the Federal Republic are saddled with unique, albeit
different historical burdens in regartl to ethnic minorities. Both.countries evinced
a strong sense of national identity up until World War II (problems with the Scots,
Welsh, Irish and maybe Bavarians notwithstanding). Neither hesitated to open its.
door,s to a 1i en. workers in the face of serious labor shortages. Accardi ng to one MP,
11
the Mother Country welcomed them when there was work tc be done," recruiting citizens from Barbados for the London Transport and Asian nurses for the National Health
Service in the 1950 1 s. German recruitment of Turkish, Jugoslavian and Italian workers
for heavy industry was delayed a. decade, by the imperatives of reconstruction. One
must b,ear in mind, however, that the "melting pot 11 is an American invention, not a
European tradition; historically, the dQminant propensity for decades was to close
national borders, not to integrate.
· · The effects of economic recession, combined with the day-to-day exposure to
alien cu1tures in one's ·own land are causing adolescents to ask what it means to be
"British 11 or "Deutsch," if only indirectly. Class-based frictions remain strong in
Britain, and very gloomy economic prospects giverise to a more aggressive identity
search. The concept of 11 neutro-nationa1isms' 1 used in conjunction with the German
peace movement, the relative leveling of class differences after the war and in- .
creased access to higher education after 196.5 could conceivably Jead to a more positive orientation among the young: as vanguards of the European peace movement, being
11
German 11 may not be all that bad
if one wants to identify c.t all. Table IV explores
pre-peace movement trends:
Table IV:. National Pride (In Percent)
Question:

Age

Country

Very
Proud

FRG
GB
Fr.

10

12~13

FRG

years

. GB .

19

Total
Sample

Fr.

17-18
years

FRG

GB

Fr.

22-·23
· years

FRG
GB

Fr.

16

25

Are you proud to be German/British/French?
Proud

37

Asha!lied
2

44
33

1
l

41
45
33

1
1

14
24
12

37
46

3

30

0

16
27
6

32
43
38

3
0
l

29
12

1

l

:

Number

l
2
3

100
100
100

1006
904
940

2
2

100
100
100

308
332 ·

100
100
100

307
342

100
100

341

r:o

Don't
~are

Response

44
26
52
37

23
50

4

45
27
55

3

1
2

48
29
52

3

100

333

332

289
2€6

Source: Jugendwerk der Deutschen She11; JUGEND Ill EUP.OPA, Band I!, 1977. p. 83.

III.

STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS:

WHO'S PROTESTING HOW?·

The initial phases of the European student movement in the mid-1960's bear little strategic resemblance to the radicalized leftist protests of the late 1970 s.
1

-15For the most part, students adopted the non-violent tactics of the American civil
rights movements: Marches, sit-ins, teach-ins and boycotts. Following .the death of
Benno Ohnesorge during a 1967 .anti-Shah demo and the 1968 assassination attempt
against Rudi Dutschke in Ber1in, the movement resorted to more militant tactics; but
violence was directed expressly.against property, not against persons. The intensity
'of the anti-Vietnam protests staged by a very fragmented Left, coupled with the rise
of Baader.:.Meinhof-style terrorism, eliminated this distinction by 1972 (Mushaben,
1980). The terrorist segment actually commands very limit_ed support; a larger group,
i.e. peace-movement activists, reject violent tactics altogether. The r·emainder share
an implicit acceptance of more militant forms of protest, including force against individuals, when other tactics have failed. It.is a passi.ve acceptance: the v_iolence
against people is a reaction to acts of physical force used by the state itself
against prates ters ..
Protest strategies of the eighties derive from two decades of organizational
experience~ The new.activism has no singletactical preference; rather, it depends
on a curious mixture of long marches through the institutions, extraparl iamentary
opposition and acts of 11 civil war" (Burgerkrieg) against the state.
A. Dimension

11

Radicalization 11 and the Criminalization of Dissent

In tenns of socialization experiences affected by politi.cal-economi.c conditions, individuals born during the 1950 1 s and 1960 1 s, and those who were raised during the war and reconstruction years. are 1 iterq1ly worlds apart. The under-35 generations have· never experienced rfght-wing dictatorships first hand. They see the
division of the world into capitalist and socialist spheres of influence as a fact
of political ·life. Youth's image of the 11 free-democratic basic orderw includes
. Berufsverbot, legislated limitations on· free speech and assembly, textbook censorship in the schools, l::ureauc"ratic penetration of the private sphere and physical
blows meted out by the long arm of _the law (Oltmanns, p. 69).·
.·
·
The "sins of youth 11 committed during the seventies and .eighties result in .criminal· r·ecords and life-long career consequences, once _the physical wounds have healed.
The sins of earlier genera ti ans have been curiously overl coked: former SS-offi cer
in the Ukraine, Rudolf Weber-Lortsch is a justice on the Federal Admtnistrativ~
Court; SS-volunteer Helmut Fuchs became president of the Mannheim Administrativ~
Court in 1978. Ministerpresident of Baden Wurttemberg Hans Filbinger, infamous for
his campaign against 11 young Communists 11 in his home state,· was finally· forced. to·
resign after his record as a Nazi-marine judge was uncovered. Former NSD.AP-:-member.
Karl Carstens currently- sits as President of. the Federal Republic; over 1000. Nazi.
judges returned to the bench after the war (01 tmanns, pp. 75,..77).
.
The number of arrests and.the extent of physical injuries accompanying protests, for which Table V provides examples, find no parallels in the sixties or
e:arly seventies.

Table V:
Location

Injuries and Arrests at Protest Events

Nature of Protest
Involved

Taken into

Convictions

Injuries

Custody

l House Occupations,

l death,

Forceful Evictions

Oec:ember 12, 1980
109 . __________________________
18
200 demonstrators
_______________________________
70_police ___ _
September, 1981 -

Pending

36

.

lOL pol ice; number
of demonstrators not

:-eveal ed
· eee=o•--•-•oo••c·___ __, ___ oa--••~-••a••=•~-~e~---~•-•-oa~•~-------••---•-,
Total 1979-82
1600
5791 trials
pending
unknown

Brixton

Anti-Reagan Dernonstrati~n, June 11, 1982

281

pending

240 demonstrators
87 police

"Race"
April 10-12, 1981

247

unavailable

4l: kncwn
demonstrators
401 police

severa 1.

unava i1 ab 1e

186

165/141

66 pending

none serious

Frankfurt

lj

Nuremberg

IKor.m-Youth Center

Startbahn-West

Oc:tober-i:over.:ber, 1981 hundred

I

°11a'rc:h 5. 1981

Southall

, Asians/NF
11

345

136

Race 11

demonstrators
97 police

April 23, 1979
Zur1c:h

ources;
in this paper.

1 deat/1,
93 Known

Autonomous Youth

1746

Center (1980)

680 pending

3 known to r.ave

lost an eye.
Other figures

unavailable.
gures are comp1 ed rrom press reports ano swr.mar1P.s rem wor s c1teo

In light of the mass turnouts at.protest demonstrations, from thousands to hundreds of thousands, the num~er of arrests alone is not particularly signiftcant.
Shocking, however, are the calls ra~sed by public officials -- whose task it is to
keep the peace -- for a major build-up of police weapons to be employed against demonstrators. From May 30 to September 12, 1980, Zurich police used 2,263 tear-gas
pellets for pistols, 1,699 tear-gas grenades, 94 refi 11 s for tear-gas 1aunchers,"
60 liters of tear-gas solution for high pressure hoses, 189 cans of tear-gas spray,
and 1,650 loadings of rubberbullets, at 35 shots a loading (Haller, p. 57). Police
at the occupied site of the proposeo Frankfu.rt airport runway have 11 experimerted'. 1 ·
with a variety of crowd-controlling instruments, including: CN gas (outlawed in 44 ·
countries by the Geneva Accords of 1925), · in the form of chemical mace, gas pistols,
grenades and "pepper fog generators; ·high pressure water hoses with CN solution;
blinding 11 shock grenades; 11 new wooden clubs, 1.2 meters long; plus 600 canisters of
11
regular 11 tear-gas and riot gear (Himmelheber, 1982, pp. 87-88). Interior Minister
Heinrich Luw.mer wants to outfit Berlin's police with rubber bullets and a nerve-gas
solution, CS, for the city 1 s high pressure hoses (TAGESSCHAU, 28. July 1982) •
11

11

. If the physical deterrents fa.il · to keep demonstrators off the streets, legal
devices also came to the rescue of besieged politicians. Court proceedings against
the 141 adolescents in Nuremberg have dragged an because of a 1977 anti-terrorist
act preventing lawyers from representing more than one client -- not enough criminal defenders in Nuremberg! Squatters in Berlin have been -- illegally --_c·harged
'Nith breach of peace against the state (Landesfriedensbruch) underJ125/ ~ 125a of
the Criminal Code, instead of with trespass tHausfriedensbruch) underS1~3. Those
with no prior convictions have been denied constitutional rights to "equal treatment,11 e.g. to a suspended sentence under.§56 (Wesel in Kursbuch #65, p. 34ff).
Inhabitants of co~munal apartments are indicted for founding a criminal organization,11.§129. Demonstrators carrying lemons to protect against tear-gas or wearing
masks are arrested for "intentions to engage in violent behavior." The AJZ disturbances in Zurich have also ge~erated a tichtening uo of the Criminal Code (~259,
11

~

~

-17§265StGB), denials of habeas corpus and limitations on the right to demonstrate_
(Schneider, 1982). As Swiss psychotherapist Paul Parin claims, "In the Federal Republic, officials.behave as if they would like to preve~t the rise of mer~ terrorists;
in Zurich, they behaveas.were it their aim to produce terrorists 11 (Interview July 20,
1982). Youth responds~ 11 Without the police, no riots!~
·
·
Radicalization among protesters is ·the direct result of the cri~inalization ~f
dissent. Criminalization occurs in stages: 1) first those who disagree with established policies and decisions are denied access to conventional poli~ical channels
(e.g. referenda); 2) dissenters receive negative, often consciously inaccurate media coverage; 3) demonstrators are subject to provocation by pol ice-ln-civilian clothes at :ral1 ies·, put under constant observation, etc.;_ 4) pol ice attired as wal ki.ng arsenals provoke fear that leads to threatened ~se of fo~c~ or panic~ which ends in cotinterforce;
5) participants are labeled and written off as chaotics, communists and criminals.-·
These stages surrunarize, in a nutshel 1, the chronology of events, the mobilization of
over 220,0b0 "average _citizens 11 protesting the removal of 3_00,000 trees for the construction of Frankfurt 1 s Startbahn West (Himmelheber, 1981; Karasek, 1981) .. The youth scene is particularly sensitive and .quick to react to hardline tactics
and_ever harsher sentencing by the state. ~epressive measures by the state escalate
the willingness among demonstrators to engage in acts of violence. When politicians•
themselves violate the rules of the game, more citizens respond with lega1-illegalscheissega1. _ Findings of an Infra test study on protest potential in the FRG might
serve as a warning to decision makers, as.-seen in Table VI.
.
Table VI:

Item

~ General

opulaticn

I

"In every democratic
society-there are certa i r, cohfl i cts which
must be resolved
through the use of force"
Disa9ree·:
!
"Every citizen has the
;
right if .necessary to pro'tect her/his convictions ,
out on the streets•·
I
Agree:

Protest_0rientations - Infratest (In Percent),

Teachers /Left Teachers
Total
\with protest
potential

-I .

I
I

65

83

54

!

I-

..

66

I.
-

I

64

84

I

n

55

100

93

86

I
I
I

I

I

-

'

I
'

I

Unemployed
· Ur.r:mployed
Students! Students
Tota 1 With Left , with Postsecondary, without Posti· secq;,df;{
rr.a tr
6~r~~f~t1 i matriculation
ru a -1, n

-r~
II

I

'

I

64 - _

77

i

i

'

I

!

92

'

;

!

90

j 83

I

55

,,,
;

100

"A citizen -loses her/his
right to strike and to.
1demonstrate, whens/he
endangers the public order•
i
. 28
48
74 77
60
18
83
46
Disagree
41
Source: Infra test W1 rtschaftsforschung, (Hrsg.). POLITISCHER PR0T~ST HI DER BUNDERSREPU6LIK DEUTSCHLAND, Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1980. pp, 84-85.
I
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Decentra l i za ti on 11 in -the Peace and' Eco 1ogy Movements .
.
Campa;'gns against materialism may have been morally uplifting· during the sixties,
but they rarely served to mobilize Herr and Frau Milller of the Silent Majority as
much as the Anti-Nuclear Energy (AKK) Moverr.ent has.One of the most valuable lessons
gleaned in. the struggles at Wyhl and Brokdorf was that smaller, locally based groups
could mobilize more demonstratofs, fast~r. Decentralization lent itself to a focui on
practical politics; at the same time, it became an antidote to bureaucratic alienation and generated alternative- sources of information. The 11 actions• in :_opposition to
Startbahn West alone have ·engaged the energies of over 66 local 11 citizen initiatives•
(Burgerinitiativen=BI) and·regional ecological groups (Ut_,WJELT EXPRESS, February, 1982).
B.

Dimension

11

.

Nuclear,power has become the European metaphor for the destructive force of unbridled technology and unrestricted corporate growth. It simultaneously invokes the
images of Hiroshima, the China Syndrome, Big-Science and Big Business in collusion

with Big Government and, ultimately, Third World deprivation in favor of arms pro-·
liferation. Where nuc1ear fervor may have serviced as a "surrogate for nationa1ism 11
in the 1950 1 s (Ne1kin and Po11ack, 1981), nuclear opposition has become a stimulus
for i nternati.ona li sm in the 1980 1 s.
·
What the AKK groups, the peace activists, the "spont1s" and.the squitters ·all have in common is their Betroffenheit, a feeling of being immediately affected by
environmental destruction. They attest to a1ogica1 connection between the dangers
involved in civilian as \-1el1 as in military uses of nuclear technology, whereas
Leftists of the sixties tended to su~port civilian applications in opposition to m11·1tary nuclear development (Otto, 1977 • The nuclear question has subsequently split
the. labor mpvement. Bath the Gennan 0GB and the British TUC -joined the anti-atomic
marchers in the late 1950 1 s (Helm, 1982; Duff, 1971). The fear that thousands of jobs
are ·at stake ·has found segments of both forging coalitions with pro-nuclear forces in
the 1980's.
·
·
_ The peace movement has a 25 year tradition, which began with the "Struggle
Ag~inst Atomic Death Campaign'' 1956-1958 and the first CND sponsored Easter March of
1959. The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament favored the long march through
the nation as a prelude to a long march through the institutions via the Labor Party.
Germans were less hopeful of an SPO electoral victory, and thus based their lessons
on the direct action strategies of the British Committee of 100 (Pestalozzi·, 1982, ·
p. 28). ·
.
No longer a NATO weakling~ the Federal Republic enjpys a focal position among
peace activists.The Cold \•Jar question, posed for so long, "What will we do when the
Russians come? 11 has been refonnulated: "What will we do if the Americans stay?" The
movement has hit the FRG in two waves. The Evangelical Church Symposium of June, 1981,
drew 120,000 to Hamburg to discuss Fear in a Nuclear Age; that wave culminated in the
non-violent Bonn demonstration of 300,00D on October 10, 1981. The Reagan pronouncem·ent in late October, 1981, regarding the conceivability. of a (winnable) limited
nuc1ear war provided additional impetus to the movement. The second wave culminated
in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982 in Bonn and Berlin.

· The mobilization of hundreds of thousands owes directly to the proliferation of
grass roots groups. Successful 11 actions 11 are manifoid: the number of German applications for conscientious objector status rose from 3,000 in the 1960's to 55,000 in
1981; several hundred "peace weeks" and workshops on "nonvio1ent action 11 have been
locally planned and executed; Green and Alternative Parties with Peace Manifestos of
their own have scored el ectora 1 successes. Mora 1 support stems from para 11 el demonstrations in neighboring countries, including the German Democratic Republi~ (Buscher,
ettl., 1981). Rallies drew400,000 in Amsterdam in November, 50,000 in Bern in December, 1981, and 200,000 in Paris, June, 1982. Over 2 million people have signed the
"Krefe l der App ea 1 , ca 11 ing for a· European peace referendum. Pub 1i c figures such as
Erhard Eppler and Rudolf Bahra add saliency to information meetings. Over 300 disannament-related proposals were submitted at the 1982 SPO convention in Munich, after
the SPO conducted its own Peace Forum in Bonn on August 27, 1981. A1together there
are over 2,300 local, national and international initiatives and institutions serving
peace activists in Europe (listed in Pesta1ozzi, pp. 344-376). All organizers stress
their contacts and cooperation with protest-groups in the US as evidence that the
campaign is not an exercise in Anti-Americanism.
11

·

The numbers ii.valved dictate a strategy of settling for the lowest common denominator: the single shared objective is to prevent the 1983 stationing of Pershing
-II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as required by the NATO Double Decision
of December 12, 1979. Their common conviction is that Theater Nuclear Forces will
render Europe a prime target, that Germany wi11 become Ground Zero in a confrontation
between the super-powers. The object is tc place the home governments ur:der as much

-19pressure as possible, insofar as: pro-disarmament forces are denied direct access to
NATO decision makers.
The tactical questions are unresolved. Contradictory opinions exist with respect
to preferences for unilateral or multilateral disarmament ~greements; debates are
waged over thedefinition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence. Activists
are divided river whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in.the Eastern bloc,
and how_to deal with nucl,ear proliferation in the Third Wor-ld. No clear answer emerges
to the question whether the build-up of conv~ntional forces is a morally acceptable
proposition. There is no single position on the feasibility of a European nuclearfree zone, on prospects for alternative defense concepts, or regarding the i nevi tabi 1ity of a political-bloc strategy.
·
··
Activists have therefore made a conscious effort to avoid a party-political o'r-·
ganizational modus, which could mean an end to the mass base. Party-political stances
within the peace movement are still too preponderant (Pestalozzi, p. 95). For.this
reason-, groups have rotated responsibility for the coordination of major events.
Action Reconciliation/Peace Services orchestrated the 11 10.10.81 11 rally in Bonn, while
the Berlin Initiative for Peace, International Balance and Security has sponsored
other eve·nts.
The notion that this is a movement 11 made in Moscow 11 is undermined by the degree
of church support it attracts, particularly in the FRG. ,Arrangements for the June,
1982 anti-Reagan demonstrations fell largely to·the Evangelical Student Community.
Church support is thus far limi✓ted to local parish initiatives in Britain, despite
the 1982 formation of a Christian CND section -"." in addition to a Green-CND wing -at the national 1evel. The Church of England' has agreed to add 11 peace 11 to its General
Synod agenda in February, 1983. ·
··
·
• As the· primary peace organization in the UK, the CNO is supported by_the European
Nuclear. Disarmament Corr:mittee, founded in April, 1980. With a national membership that
has grown from 3,000 to 36,000 between January, 1980 a1nd June, 1981, the CND relies
on the efforts of 1000 locals, encompassing a quarter of a ~ill ion sympathizers.
Even the peace movement in Switzerland is growing, slowly but steadily. Organizers attribute the delay to the tradition of Swiss 11 neutrality, 11 to the emphasis on
conventional defense and, in part, to the direct-democracy orientation. European
disarmament is not subject to the outcome of referenda at the Cantonal level. Decentralized decision-making has nonetheless benefited the anti.-nuclear energy campaign
(Aubert, 1981). Swiss l.'Jusos 1.1 are spearheading a drive to· introduce alternative mi 1 itary service -- the only other country in the Western ·continental camp besides Turkey
without a C.O. option.
·
··
An estimated ·OM 2. 2 bill ion wil 1 go to create the necessary infrastructure for
the NATO deployments, the Gennan share amounting to OM 10 million: This• has added a
new element to the, campaign against ·startbahn-West, because of the obvious conriection
between the Frankfurt airport and Rhein:'""Main Air Force Base; as Foreign Minister ·
Genscher openly admitted this year (STERN, 18. February 1982; Himmelheber, pp. 7-9;
Hechler, 1981, pp. 165-174). Thus, another link has been forged between- the peace and
ecology movements.
·
·
·
The emphasis on decentralization has proved organ.iiati_onally effective. The large
number of initiatives involved conveys the impression. of a unified political front.
In reality, however, activists will have difficulty finding a new set of cornmori objectives, once the· deployment deadline has. passed in 1983. (especially if all goes according to NAT0 1 s plan). Decentralization is nonetheless significant·for ideo1ogic:al
reasons as well. Both-anti-nuclear drives have instilled in hundreds o~ thousands
a different understanding of the role of participation in democratic society.

C.

Oirr.ension

11

Institutionalization 11

-

From Alternative to Initiative to Party

For the leftists of the late sixties, the Long March and the Extraparliamentary
Opposition (APO) were not exactly mutually exclusive propositions. In Germany, the
SPD remained the clear favorite throughout the Grand Coalition 1966 - 1969, and the
Social Democrats were helped into power by the newly enfranchised voters they had
actively recruited. Brandt's extensive platform of social refonns in 1969 1ed leftists
to believe that the SPD could be used as a vehicle for cracking open formerly elite
instituti•:>ns, such as universities. They took seriously Brandt's exhortation to 11 dare
more democracy. II .
.
By the 1980's, European social democratic parties -- along with their more conservative competitors -- seem to expend more energy distancing themselves from their
own radical youth factions than they do cultivating new recruits. Primary examples
are the SPD Ju sos and the Labo·ur Party I s Militant Tendency ( LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES
28. June 1982). SPD Bundesgeschaftsfuhrer Peter Glatz sumr.-:arizes tr.e problem: ''The
Party awakened false hopes that parties could change lives and alter the relation-··
ships among human beings' 1 (Oltmanns, p. 114). For Germany, Glatz and others now picture a society divided into 11 two cultures" -- the political establishment and the
"alternative scene. 11
•
\·iho er what is "alternative" has consequently become the new 64 mil 1ion 0-Mark
question, as political scientist and Netzwerk cofounder Joseph Huber points out.
The 11 a1terna tive 11 spectrum encompasses a plethora of "peop1 e, milieus, motives and
o~1nions" (r.uter, 1981, p. 9). Among the organized groups, a few are radicalized,
some are nationalized, many are depoliticized and all are decentralized and decidedly
post-mat~rialistic. Those who continue to engage in politi~s locat~ along an ideological spectrum·stretching from left-wing social democratic, ~to radical democratic to
anti-parliamentarian.

Alternative groups concern themselves i,.iith everything from religious sects to
therapy groups, from agricultural life-styles to urban v1elfare services, from civil
liberties to Third World initiatives. Huber estimates that there are over 11,500 projects in the FRG, involving 80,000 activists. If all sympathizers are taken into account, the figure falls between 300,000-400,000. The breakdown of project types holds
12 percent devoted to "production," 70 percent to "services" and 18 percent pursuing
"political work," 29. percent entail handwork; 71 percent of the projects call for
mental labor (Huber, pp. 28~30).
· '
·
The second culture appears to consist of three strata, with three strategic
orientations. Neither the Long March nor the APO strategy has been complete1y abandoned by the politically disillusioned of the eighties. Their strategic repertoire
has in a way been expanded by the addition of the "drop-out11 option. The last category is not limited to the squatter scene. There are a1so those in Wohngemeinschaften,
who buy their Mus1i and bread in alternative shops, patronize cooperative bookstores,
read only newspapers from leftist presses, baby-sit in anti-authoritarian day-care
centers,•work in small self-organized businesses, view old Bogart movies in "offcinemas," and are ultimately proud of the fact that they have had no contact with
"the outside" for\several years ·(Fichter and Lonnendoncker, in Richter, 1979) . .
One question which provokes di~sension among many groups is ~hether or not to
accept state subsidies for alternative projects;some fear cooptation, others are admant in their rejection of the system as. a whole. Netzwerk Se1bsthi1fe. has provided
one alternative source of capital for .projects, based on sympathizers' voluntary contributions. As Hans Maier from Wissenschaftzentrum/IMM Berlin pointed out, this ~traturn of drop-outs may in fact be the most consistently po1itica1 of the three, insofar
as the 1ife-style itself reflects a radical concept of po1itical-economy. The work
i~ small, self-organized undertakings rests on a belief that democratic decision-

-21m~king can only occur in the presence of decentralized-economic relations. The .
Netzwerk system enhances their economic significance, but also runs the risk of turning the alternatives into a secondary, integrated "free market system·~ ..
-
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Citizen action groups, the Burgerin-itiativen, constitute
reincarnated.-extra--parl iamentary opposition to the established party system. At the same time, they also
- fit the "institutional"_ image in the lobby or pressure group tradition. As the first
initiatives organized during the late 1960's,: they were viewed as political action
.committees appended to the SPD. Their extraparliamentary engagement in the -environmental field was expected to complement party platform efforts.By the mid-1970's,
the BI's had become an autohomouir force, indeed a source-·of direct opposition. The·
anti-Startbahn·initiatives will likely catapult the:SPD from power in Hess·en,come·
the September 1982 elections (Schiller-Dickhut, et _tl., · 1981). · · - II

.

-

There are an estimated -38,000 Burgerinitiativen in .Germany, backed by at. least _
15·mi1lion sympathizers~ Membership figures.outstrip those of the established ·parties,
· and the model has been emulated by citizens th·rougliout Western Europe. The unifying
factor is the Ecology Movement, coordinated through a nati.onal roof organization, the
Federation of Citizen Initiatives· for Environmental Protection (BBU-) ~ ·over the decade,
thi BI's have deVeloped a more sjstematic·political tritique direcied against Onre~
stric_ted economic growth and the des·truction of the environment via technology -- a
theme shared-with the-peace movement. BI membership shows a substantial 9verlap·with
the original APO and Long March generation. Participants share an. upp·er-middle class
·background, are highlyeducated, well-fnfor-med, and self-:confident with respect to·
their own political skills~ _
- ·
· ·
·
·
Resurrected political causes·,- self-confidence and acquired·organ-izational skills
are being rechanneled into the political establishme_nt through the Green; Ecology and
Alternative Parties, that hava taken root in S~ede~, Britain, Fr.Snee, Italy, as well
as in the Federal Republic. The relative strength of these parties is in part a func_tion of the respective electoral system·. The proporz principle>in Switzerland, has
maintained a stable, four-party coalition since December, 1959, driving ecologists
back into these parties (Aubert, p. 223ff). The winner-take-all tradition in Britain,
already under .fire from the new SOP, leaves little room for parliamentary activity
by the nascent Ecology Party there. The combined proportional represent_ation and
list systems in the FRG have· unlocked the ·doors to-new parties, but the 11 5 percent
clause" has ~revented the Greens from crossing th~ thresh6ld at the national level.
Substantial progress has nonetheless been made; alternative parties have attained
legislative seats in Berlin (May,
1981)~ Bremen (October 1979),' Hamburg. (June 1978)
and in the CDU-stronghold of Baden.;.Wurttem~erg (March 1980)_. Continentally, the
Greens even garnered 3.2 percent in the first direct elections to the European Parlia~ent (June 1979).
·
The Green .and Alternative List (Al-) Parties are tied to other protest groups by
virtue of their common emphasis on autonomy, direct participation, solidarity, envionmental compatibility; transparency ·of decision-making and variety (Raschke, 1982).
Diversity is reflected in the fact that there are free-greens, red-greens, browngreens, . black-greens and multi co 1ored-greens, though members have tried to avoid· $plits along ideological lines by proclaiming th1iy_move 11 neither left nor right but
forwards" (Raschke, p. 325). Moderates f~voring depoliticization. distance themselves
from the communist groups, the relics of. 11 yester:lear. 11 Radicals seeking repoliticiza:tion have now created another party, the Democra ;ic Soc.ialists -- a mirror image of
the SOP/Labour Party split -- through the efforts of Martin Coppik (TAGESZEITUNG,
18. June 1982). Disparate positions on tactical radicalization and the role of vie- lence have also produced.confusion among the ranks. The Alternative List - Berlin
offered an extreme example this summer, as it literally crawled out from under the
· debris of a violent, illegal anti-Reagan demon~.tration and the subsequent firebombing of its hea-dquarters .(TP.,GESSPIEGEL, TAGESZE~TUMG, 10-15 June 1982).

-22The regionally based AL/Green Parties are the unique product of two decades
of protest ~xperience. They constitute an Extraparliamentary Opposition-WithinParliament.- Outside the legislative assembly, they work actively with the BI 1 s. Inside parliament, they view their participation• as a vehicle of support for the extraparliamentary movements (Schi11er-Dickhut, pp. 147-149). Decision-making rests on
the consensus·principle; debate in the 1oca1 and plenary assemblies
(Mitgliedervol1versamm1unaen) continues until a· common position emerges. Whether the
Alternatives/Greens prove institutionilly effective in the long run will depend on
whether or not they are able to reconcile their own direct-democratic procedures ·
with the imperatives of the parliamentary process. A conscious non-decision in the
absence of consensus has little effect if the parliamentary majority refuses to wait
until one-evolves. Further, the larger the parttes grow, the harder it will be to
adhere to 11 fundamentally-Elemocratic 11 dec·ision-,procedures. Michels 1 spectre of oligarchy lurks in the political wings.
_ The.Alternative Parties_ enjoy substantial support among otherwise: apolitical
youth. The 19$1 Shell study reveals that, following the 32 percent ,,.,ho identify with
no party~ 20 percent back the Greens, as opposed-to 24 percent for the SPD and 18
percent for the CDU/CSU (Jugeridwerk, 1981, p. 674) ., Green sympathizers evince higher
levels of unemployment and are more pessimistic about the future than established
party supporters. Twenty percent is not bad for a party founded in 1979/80. It signifies an i dent.ifi cation too new to have been conveyed through traditi cna 1 parenta 1
channels. Curiously enough, the British SOP has also picked up young supporters by
virtue of its image as an 11 a 1ternative 11 to the major parties. More importantly, that
support has risen from 6.3 percent in 1980 to 24.6 percent in 1982 -- among white_
working class youth who also sympathize with the National Front and British Movement!
(Cochrane and Billig, 1982). The Alternative Movement, and the parties mobilizing
behind it, may be the only agent still capable of catching young rebels and offering
them a degree of social integration and Lebenssinn (01tmanns, p. 275). The No Future
generation might otheNise become a se·i f-fu lfi 11 i ng prophecy.

.lJ.
\'
PROTEST 'AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF EUROPEAtJ DEMOCRACIES-

A. The Parties·,· the People and the Defl;ocra tic Process
Protest potential in \~estern Europe has increased, as has extremist potential
(Infratest, 1980}. Protest is on the rise, as Suzanne Berger notes, because of a
11
faile::! connect'ion 11 betw€.:en the estab1ished parties, on the·one hand, and. the requi si tr:s of the ·new pol i-ti cs, on the other (Berger, 1979). Perhaps the two most fundamenta1 questfons facing .democratic systems today are 1) to what extent can this
growing protest potential be integrated into the existing political system; 2) to
what extent is _the state wi11ing to integrate a variety of protest-generated
i niti a.ti ves?
Past-Materialist values, ~.g. the eMphasis on self-actualization and greater
individual·autonomy, have:already effected changes in citizen attitudes toward participation and protest. If 1·1odell-Deutsch12nd offers any insights as .to future
trends; ho1;1ever, the politic~leadersh·ir can r2st assured that 1eftist protest .pot~ntfoi "is id:::ologically str11 firmly bound to th-2 democratic system 11 (rnfratest,
1980, p. 106). The change in o~~ientations. toward dernocr,1.cy rests with a greater acceptance-: of non-conventional •forms of participation; the ~le'I Politics differs 1•/ith
iespect to means, not ends. ·This· grmving acceptance is a European-vlide pher.ornenc,n,
1s Tables VII and VIII illustrate:

Tab 1e V!i: _Acceptance _of Unconventional ·
Forms of-Participation in the Federal RepublicSeale *
Persons -who express support for un~
Valu~ - ·conventional forms and who would
be prepared· to engage in such under
certair. .conditions N=4008

Unconventiuna 1
Participation

Participation in a petition
drive

1

90.9%

Participation in a "Citizen
-Initiative"

2-

85.7%

. 3

58.0~

4
5

30.1%
18.8%

Blocking traffic with a
demons tra cion

6

13.4%

Participation in a wildcat
strike

7

8.3%

Taking over/occupying factor~
. fes, offices, public buildings

8

5.5%

Joining in a licensed political- 'demonstration
Participation in a Boycott
Withholding of Rent, Interest
or.Taxes

Destruction of private property
Use of physicai force
against persons

9

1.3%

10

0.6%

*Items with a scalP. value 4-6 classified as Political Activism .
.Items witll a scale value 7-!0 coded by lnfratest as Protest Potential ..
Source: Infra test \lirtschaf:57:;:-:;:h•11"S ~,..b. H. POLIT!SCHER CROTEST IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK" DEUTSCHLAND, St~,tsart: Koh 1harrmer, i9oG, p; 49.

Table VIII: ·orientation to Political Behavior
and Acceptable Fon::s·of Participation (In Percent)
_ .

Country

Apo1itica1

(1976)
~~; xsd

Only

On1y
U:-iccr.~,·en: i ar:a 1

Cr-!'lven:~ O!iU.;

Federal Republic
Fil\1ilnd

Great Britain•
Italy
Netherlands
Au~tria
Switzerland

USA

27
25
30
24
18
35

33

13.

35

:t9

33
34

· 15
7

39

11

27

19

24

37

15

12

50 -

18 ·

.Total

100
100
100
100
100
100

27
21
22
35
32
19
24
20

ioo
100

. Source: Max Kaase,- "Partizioatorische Revolution-Ende der l'arteien?" in
Joachim Raschke (Hrsg.) -BORGER UIIO PARTEIEN, 0pladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982,

184.

· ·

-

.

. .

Max Kaase finds a positive corre1ation between the scales for conventional and
unconventional types of political behavior. He-interprets this as a.sign that nonconventional participatory forms expand the citizens• political .repertoire, thus
allowing for more flexible involvement in the decision-making process (Kaase, p.
183). The data also make clear 11 that the established actors in-the political process,
above all the political parti~s, no longer have the chance to exercise a monopolistic
claim over involvement in the political consen·sus-building and decisicn-making process11 (Kaase, p. 184). They are unlikely to relinquish this ·monopoly with style and
grace, however.
The 11 intellectual head-movement 11 of the late 1960 1 s which has found a home in
protest· campaigns for peace arid environmental protection perhaps unwittingly -- is
pursuing a path outlined by t'arcuse over a decade ago. They have learned that political powerbrokers and whole systems
cannot be pushed aside, they must be combatted on their own grounds. This
means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular liberation,
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refusa 1 , withdrawal , mus.t proceed within the pol i ti ca 1 context, defined by the
situation in which the radical opposition finds itself, and must continue,
in the theory and practice, the radical critique of the estab1ishment within
the Establishment (Marcuse, 1972t p. 49)".
The dua 1 strategy adopted by the A1terna ti ve and Green parties, a1ong with the
extensive use of petitions and referenda, etc. indicate that protesters are willing
to have their causes integrated into the system; to what degree is still uncertain.

Through the vehicles of· protest, initiatives and alternative projects, activists
have discovered, however, that the majoritarian parties are unwilling to rework their
ideologies, programs and decisional structures. Increasingly it is the Catch-All parties themselves that are recognized as "insurmountable obstacles to the satisfaction
of important social needs ••. in fact they limit9 constrain and undermine 11 (Berger,
p. 40). Established parties have undertaken a common effort to prevent voter losses
which stand to benefit the Alternatives and Greens. These efforts have ranged from
ridicule ("romantic ideal ists 11 ) to scare tactics ( 11 a Green vote is a lost vote the CDU will come to power 11 ) , to outright denunciation and criminalization (Genscher/
FOP: 11 coalition of growth-rejectors 11 TAGESSPIEGEL, 6. July 1982; Stoiber/GOU: "same
rhetorical methods as the Nazis" TAGESSPIEGEL, 25. July 1982).
If new actors, pol icy preferences and values cannot be integrated into traditional political institutions -- this in the face of an ever~expandir:lg state -- then
"the great missed opportunity of the last decade" may actually eliminate the established parties sooner than the protest groups themselves. The Greens may yet do to
the SPD what Franz Josef Strauss failed to accomplish in the late seventies -- in
the spirit of David stalking Goliath.

8.

Scmethi ng 01 d 2nd Something Ne\'1
Ncnlef t
11

11
-

From the 01 d Left to the Nevi Left to the

After this "lengthy march through the European protest landscape, I will only
attempt to highlight a few of the differences observed along the way from the sixties
to the eighties.
Protesters of the 1960 1 s campaigned for radical system transformation. Their
frustrations, anger and critiques were directed against the performance failures of
the capitalist system in the past. The Long March strategy they adopted reflected a
degree of trust in the-state's ability to master crises and to accommodate social
change, however. The econol'f'lic and technological developments of the last decade have
intensified the desire as well as the need for radical changes in the political
system.
'But the willingness to engage in the process of system transformation is declining rapidly among the younger c1ass of today s protesters, at the same tirneit
is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated in the eariier
movements. The depression, alienation and anger of youth protesters in the 1980 s
concentrates on their perceived 1ack of future prospects. These rebels tru~t neither
the Left. nor the Right, nor are they directly interested in overthrowing the state.
They want to be 1eft alone, to choose their own life-styles. They scoff at the 68grandpas who still haven't registered that we aren't fighting for the public, but
for us!" (Kursbuch, p. 15).
1

1

11

1

The Ne•"'· Left rejected the Old Left at the end of the sixties for_ its traditional commitment to hierarchy and vanguardisrn. The Soviet bureaucratic monolith
no better suited the New Left's utccian image than did -the rat race of competitive
capitalism. The Nonleft of the eight~es rejects ~he New Left and the old APO as

-25- ·
e1 ements of an i ntell ectua 1 "head movement, ii which indeed they wereo The APO. of .
1968 directed its charges against, but also addressed itse1f to the established in-'
stitutions. The 11 class of -1 68 11 was told that its language was incomprehensible (it·
was). The degree to which students have lost prominence in the new movements is. best.
i11.ustrated by the fact that 11 the carr,pus of Berlin 1 s Free University nowadays resembles the aband_oned parking lot of an office bui1ding. on weekends" (01tmanns, p~89).
.

.

The punks,rockers, rostas and squatters are alleged to have no language at all.
But they speak the visceral languag~ of Ancst, to which politicians dare give little
expression. 11 We· have ·enough reasons -to cry without your tear-gas 11 .;. and their fear has
a rational and active core; The Angst is not over growing old; rather, it relates
to the.serious problems facing society as a whole~ such as nucle·ar proliferation,
environmental destruction and structur.al unemployment. Paradoxically, support among
the young for the peace and ecology_movements is great, but their active participation is limited. Their initial politicai experiences have been n·egative and physical.
The unifying factor among the protest movements is no longer an overarching ideology, but the substantive conr:iections·that participants are discovering as each movement evolves. The repressive character of capitalism~ se has been downplayed; it
is not only the corporations, but large-scale organizations in general that have been·
rejected in favor of. communal, self-help projects and groups. The activists of the
eighties are much less naive about accepting .further ·technological development as the ·
solution to fundamenfal social problems. The emphasis is placed on human dignity, ·sensitivity and solidarity.
·
Learning experi~nces for the.over-30 activists have been bf-a more p6sitiv~,-organizational character. Through the BI 1 s, they seek Jo draw political decision-making
back ihto those spheres, down_ to those levels where they can hope to exercise collective influence. This group rejects preprogrammed political decisions,which politicians
try to legitimiz_e on the.basis of technical or budgetary imperatives •. They are sti.11
de.'Tian~ing ~hat the system ·dare more democracy.
·
·
.

.

.

.

·_ Not exactly .a 11 '68-Grandma 11 ,myself, I passed my 30th birthday amidst the antiReagan activists in Berlin, observing the generation gap first hand, as former APO's
with_ baby carriages, groups of guestworkers and even church leaders lined up to demonstrate 70,000-80,000 strong with students, punks and squatters. In search of Verstehen
(and in need of some moral support as I sprang the 30 threshold), I returned to Marcuse
for an explanation of what was happening 11 then 11 - only to discover
that the Essay en
Liberation mirrors niore closely the protest events Of· 11 now: 11 •. ,
.
•
. · ,
The militants have invalidated the concept of 11 utopia 11 - t·hey have denounced
a vicious ideology. No matter whether their action was 11 a revolt or an abortive
11
revolution, if is a turning point. In proclaiming the p~rman~nt chfllenge : · ·
the 11 permanent educat1on, 11 the Great Refusal, they recognize tne marK of social
repression, even in the most sublime manifestations: of traditional culture,.
even in the most spectacular manifestations of technical progress. They have
again raised a spectre (and this time a spectre which haunts not only the_
boutgeoisie but all exploitative bureauc~acies): the spectre of a revolution
which subordinates the development of productive forces jnd higher stan~ards
of living to the requirements of creating solidarity for the human. species
(Marcuse, 1969, p. ix). · ·
That ~pectre is indeed haunting Western Europe.
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